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Match Bias in Wage Gap Estimates
Due to Earnings Imputation
Barry T. Hirsch,

Trinity University and IZA, Bonn

Edward J. Schumacher,

Trinity University

About 30% of workers in the Current Population Survey have
earnings imputed. Wage gap estimates are biased toward zero
when the attribute being studied (e.g., union status) is not a criterion used to match donors to nonrespondents. An expression
for “match bias” is derived in which attenuation equals the sum
of match error rates. Attenuation can be approximated by the
proportion with imputed earnings. Union wage gap estimates with
match bias removed are presented for 1973–2001. Estimates for
recent years are biased downward 5 percentage points. Bias in gap
estimates accompanying other non–match criteria (public sector,
industry, etc.) is examined.

I. Introduction
The Current Population Survey (CPS) provides the principal data
source for estimates of union-nonunion wage premiums and sectoral wage
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differentials.1 As widely recognized, many individuals surveyed in the
CPS (and other household surveys) either refuse to report their earnings
or “proxy” respondents in their household are unable to report earnings
(Rubin 1983; Lillard, Smith, and Welch 1986).2 Rather than compile official
statistics based on large numbers of incomplete records, the census allocates or imputes earnings for those with missing values. During the
1980s, fewer than 15% of workers in the CPS had earnings imputed. This
figure rose with the 1994 change in CPS earnings questions, and it has
continued to increase in recent years. In 2001, 31% of all private and
public sector wage and salary employees in the CPS earnings files had
weekly earnings imputed by the census.
Despite its prevalence, earnings imputation has been given relatively
little attention in the large empirical literature on wage differentials, much
of which is based on the CPS.3 The principal reason for this is that it is
believed that earnings are imputed accurately on average and therefore
nonsystematic error in the dependent variable does not bias explanatory
variable coefficients. The prevailing view is stated succinctly by Angrist
and Krueger (1999) in their comprehensive survey article on empirical
methods. After comparing regression estimates with and without inclusion
of allocated earners (and with and without weighting), the authors state:
“The results in table 12 suggest that estimates of a human capital earnings
function using CPS and Census data are largely insensitive to whether or
not the sample is weighted . . . , and whether or not observations with
allocated values are included in the sample” (Angrist and Krueger 1999,
p. 1354). It is of interest that the wage equations estimated by Angrist
and Krueger, using the March CPS, contained neither sectoral (industry
and public sector) nor union status variables. Had these variables been
1

For an analysis of union wage gap studies through the early 1980s, see Lewis
(1986). Recent analyses of wage gaps over time include Blanchflower (1999) and
Bratsberg and Ragan (2002). Hirsch and Macpherson (2002) provide annual CPS
union wage gap estimates for 1973–2001 for alternative worker and sectoral groups
(industry and public/private). Frequently cited studies on interindustry wage differentials include Dickens and Katz (1987), Krueger and Summers (1988), and
Gibbons and Katz (1992). Literature on wage differentials in the public sector is
summarized in Gregory and Borland (1999).
2
Groves and Couper (1998) provide an analysis of factors determining household response rates in six national surveys, each having households linked to
records in the 1990 decennial census.
3
There has been considerable attention given to mismeasurement in reported
earnings in the CPS (Mellow and Sider 1983; Bound and Krueger 1991; Bollinger
1998). These authors have been careful to delete allocated earners from their
analysis. Hirsch and Schumacher (1998) omit allocated earners, noting the possible
mismatch between the union status of workers and donors. Hirsch and Macpherson (2000, appendix), find that wage differential estimates among air transport
workers, particularly pilots, are sensitive to treatment of allocated earners.
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included, Angrist and Krueger are likely to have arrived at a different
conclusion.
The U.S. Census allocates earnings using a “hot deck” imputation
method that matches each nonrespondent to an individual or “donor”
whose characteristics are identical. The donor’s reported earnings are then
assigned to the nonrespondent. Among the more important characteristics
used in matching a donor to a nonrespondent are gender, age, education,
and hours worked, four strong correlates of earnings. Two characteristics
not used are union status and sector (e.g., industry) of employment.
The principal argument of this article is straightforward. The research
literature in labor economics abounds with estimates of wage differentials
with respect to worker and job attributes. If the attribute under study is
not used as a census match criterion in selecting a donor, wage differential
estimates (with or without controls) are biased toward zero. This bias is
large and exists independent of any bias from the nonrandom determination of missing earnings (i.e., response bias). This article analyzes the
systematic “match bias” attaching to estimated wage differentials for attributes that are not imputation match criteria. We focus in particular on
estimates of union wage premiums, giving limited attention to the estimation of industry and public sector wage differentials.
In what follows, we first discuss the imputation methods used by the
U.S. Census to allocate earnings for nonrespondents. A general expression
is derived that provides a measure of match bias (or attenuation) in wage
gap estimates, absent covariates. This is subsequently expanded to a regression framework with covariates. Correlation between union status (in
the case of union gap estimates) and the explicit match criteria improves
match quality and mitigates bias in wage gaps without covariates. That
same correlation can exacerbate bias in regression gap estimates accounting
for covariates.
Failure to account for earnings imputation causes a substantial understatement in the union wage gap. This bias is particularly severe since
1994. Changes over time in how allocated earners are designated in the
CPS have led researchers to report misleading changes in union wage
gaps. In particular, what appears as a large and puzzling drop in the CPS
union gap between 1978 and 1979 (Freeman 1986; Lewis 1986) is accounted for in large part by changes in the treatment of workers with
allocated earners. A set of time-consistent union wage gap estimates for
the 1973–2001 period indicates a pattern that differs in several respects
from existing evidence. Although our emphasis is on union wage gaps, a
similar match bias is found in estimates of industry, public sector, city
size and region, and other differentials studied extensively in the labor
economics literature.
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II. Census Imputation Methods for Allocating Earnings
The census allocates missing earnings using “hot deck” imputation
methods. Most familiar to researchers is the hot deck method used to
impute earnings in the March CPS Annual Demographic Files (for details,
see Lillard et al. [1986]). Using this method, matching of a nonrespondent
with a donor is done in steps, with each step involving a less detailed
match requirement. For example, suppose that there were just four matching variables—sex, age, education, and occupation. The matching program
would first attempt to find an exact match on the combination of variables,
where each is segmented at a relatively detailed level. When there is not
a successful match at a given level, matching proceeds to the next step,
where a less detailed breakdown is used, say, broader occupations and
age categories. As emphasized by Lillard, Smith, and Welch, the probability of a close match declines the less common are an individual’s
characteristics.
Much of our current knowledge about the labor market in general and
union and nonunion wages in particular is based on research using the
CPS Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) Earnings Files. The CPS-ORG
files are made up of the quarter sample of individuals in the monthly
survey who are asked, among other things, usual weekly earnings, hours
worked, and union status.
The CPS-ORG files use an imputation procedure called the “cell hot
deck” method, which differs from the method used in the March CPS.
The census creates cells based on the following seven categories: gender
(2 cells), age (6), race (2), education (3), occupation (13), hours worked
(8), and receipt of tips, commissions, or overtime (2), a matrix of 14,976
possible combinations.4 The census keeps all cells “stocked” with a donor,
insuring that an exact match is always found. The donor in each cell is
the most recent person surveyed by the census with reported earnings
and all the characteristics. When a new person with those characteristics
is surveyed and reports earnings, the census replaces the previous occupant
of the cell. To insure an occupant of each cell, the census reaches back as
far as necessary within a given survey month and then to previous months
and years. When surveyed individuals do not report earnings, their earnings
are imputed by assigning the value of (nominal) earnings reported by the
current donor occupying the cell with an exact match of characteristics.5
4

Details on the coding of variables used to form the census cells can be provided
by the authors.
5
A brief discussion of census/CPS hot deck methods is contained in U.S.
Department of Labor (2002, p. 9.3). A more detailed description was provided
by economists at the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Census Bureau. Although
the “cell hot deck” procedure has been used for the CPS-ORG files since their
beginning in 1979, the selection categories have not been identical over time. Prior
to 1994, there were six usual hours worked categories and thus 11,232 cells.
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Location is not an explicit match criterion using the cell hot deck, but
files are sorted by location and nonrespondents are matched to the most
recent donor match (i.e., the geographically closest person moving backward in the file).6 If matched to someone in a similarly priced neighborhood, the donor is more likely to have earnings similar to the nonrespondent than if the match is based exclusively on the mix of attributes
defining each cell. Downward bias in wage gap estimates is mitigated as
the difference between reported and imputed wages shrink. Mitigation of
bias from this “location effect” is likely to be very small, except for
nonrespondents in highly populated cells.
Although not the focus of this article, attention has been given in the
literature to alternative imputation methods that address shortcomings in
standard hot deck methods. An imputation procedure is regarded as
“proper” if it restores fully the sampling variability. Single imputation
procedures are “not proper” because they do not incorporate information
about the uncertainty associated with the choice of the value to impute.
“Multiple imputation” methods select multiple donors for each missing
observation (or, stated alternatively, create multiple data sets) and permit
the researcher to account for the variability associated with the assignment
of an imputed value.7
The census hot deck procedures assume either no response bias or “ignorable response bias” whereby the match criteria capture differences in
earnings. For example, the likelihood of nonresponse might vary with
schooling, occupation, and other match attributes, but as long as the earnings of respondents and nonrespondents within cells are equivalent, there
is no response bias resulting from the imputation procedure. “Nonignorable
response bias” occurs if the earnings of donors with the same match characteristics as nonrespondents provide a biased estimate of earnings (Rubin
1983, 1987).
The bias examined in this article occurs independently of whether or not
there is nonignorable response bias. Even if nonrespondents are selected
randomly, there will be “match bias” toward zero in wage gap estimates
Beginning in 1994, usual work hours could be reported as “variable.” Two additional hours cells were added for workers reporting variable hours, one for
those who usually work full time and one for those who usually work part time.
6
In the March CPS, region serves as an explicit match criterion for selecting
donors.
7
Rubin (1983, 1987) has proposed multiple imputation procedures that are
proper and that model the likelihood of having a missing value. Imputed values
are obtained from multiple donors who have similar probabilities of being in the
nonresponse group (e.g., similar “propensity scores” constructed from logit estimation). Treatment effects can be estimated using identical methods (Heckman,
Ichimura, and Todd 1998; Angrist and Krueger 1999; Heckman, LaLonde, and
Smith 1999).
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associated with non–match criteria (union status, industry, public sector,
etc.).
III. Imputed Earnings and Match Bias in Wage
Differential Estimates
Let G represent the unbiased estimate of Wu ⫺ Wn , the difference in mean
log wages between two groups u and n (union and nonunion in our
example), absent covariates. The subsequent section extends the analysis
to a regression framework with covariates. The analysis applies to the
case where the wage differential attribute being studied is not a match
criterion used to identify donors. Below we show conditions under which
the match bias is equal to QG, where Q is the proportion of workers with
imputed earnings. Although these conditions may not be satisfied exactly,
QG may provide a good approximation of bias in many applications (i.e.,
proportionate attenuation in the wage gap is approximated by Q).
We first derive the general formula for match bias absent covariates and
then show under what circumstances the bias simplifies to QG. For the
purpose of exposition, assume that there exist two groups, union and nonunion, with Wu and Wn representing unbiased measures of their mean log
wages and G the log wage differential. Union and nonunion nonresponse
rates are designated Qu and Qn, with rates of response being (1 ⫺ Qu ) and
(1 ⫺ Q n ). Let ru be the proportion of union donors and (1 ⫺ ru ) be the
proportion of nonunion donors assigned to union nonrespondents. Likewise, rn is the proportion of union donors and (1 ⫺ rn ) is the proportion
of nonunion donors assigned to nonunion nonrespondents.
The measured earnings Wu and Wn for, respectively, union and nonunion
workers (i.e., “edited” earnings) will be the weighted average of those
reporting earnings and nonrespondents with imputed earnings. That is,
Wu p (1 ⫺ Qu )Wu ⫹ Qu [ruWu ⫹ (1 ⫺ ru )Wn ],

(1)

Wn p (1 ⫺ Q n )Wn ⫹ Q n [rnWu ⫹ (1 ⫺ rn )Wn ],

(2)

where the bracketed expressions are mean wages, respectively, for union
and nonunion workers with imputed earnings.
The measured or observed union wage gap in most empirical studies
is Wu ⫺ Wn, with match bias, B, being the difference between unbiased
and biased wage gap estimates, or
B p (Wu ⫺ Wn ) ⫺ (Wu ⫺ Wn )
p Wu ⫺ Wn ⫺ {(1 ⫺ Qu )Wu ⫹ Qu [ruWu ⫹ (1 ⫺ ru )Wn ]}
⫹ {(1 ⫺ Q n )Wn ⫹ Q n [rnWu ⫹ (1 ⫺ rn )Wn ]}.

(3)

Match Bias

695

Simplification of equation (3) yields the following general expression for
the extent of match bias:
B p [(1 ⫺ ru )Qu ⫹ rnQ n ]G,

(4)

where G p Wu ⫺ Wn. The term in brackets represents attenuation in G.
An “attenuation coefficient” g, with one representing no attenuation and
zero complete attenuation, can be defined as
g p 1 ⫺ [(1 ⫺ ru )Qu ⫹ rnQ n ].

(4  )

Interpretation of (4) and (4) is straightforward. The term in brackets
is the sum of mismatch rates for both groups of workers. The term
(1 ⫺ ru )Qu represents the number of false negatives or, probabilistically,
Pr (u d p 0Fu p 1), the probability of a match with a nonunion donor
given that the nonrespondent is union. The term rnQ n measures the false
positive rate or Pr (u d p 1Fu p 0), the probability of a union earnings
donor given a nonunion nonrespondent. There would be no match bias
if either there were no allocated earners (Qu p Q n p 0) or there were no
donor mismatch ((1 ⫺ ru ) p rn p 0).
Equation (4) can be simplified further. If the union-nonunion donor
mix is identical for union and nonunion respondents so that ru p rn p
r, match bias is
B p [(1 ⫺ r)Qu ⫹ rQ n ]G.

(5)

Finally, assuming an equivalent donor mix and equal rates of nonresponse
so that Qu p Q n p Q, the match bias formula reduces to the simple
expression
B p QG,

(6)

with the degree of attenuation equal to Q and an attenuation coefficient
g p 1 ⫺ Q.

(6  )

Evident from equation (5) is that bias is likely to exceed QG (where Q
is the full-sample nonresponse rate) if we assume that the union density
of donors is less than .50 (i.e., (1 ⫺ r) 1 r) and if union workers have a
nonresponse rate exceeding that of nonunion workers. In the event that
the nonresponse rate for union workers is less than that for nonunion
workers, bias is less than QG.
As will be shown later, QG provides a reasonable approximation of the
match bias in union-nonunion wage gaps. The reasons are twofold. First,
nonresponse rates are similar for union and nonunion workers. Second,
although correlation between union status and the explicit match criteria
acts to mitigate bias, this is offset by increased bias within a regression
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framework due to inclusion of wage covariates correlated with union
status as controls (see the next section).
The match bias in log wage gaps has been shown above. The upward
adjustment to roughly correct for match bias is
Wu ⫺ Wn p G
p (Wu ⫺ Wn )/{1 ⫺ [(1 ⫺ ru )Qu ⫹ rnQ n ]}

(7)

p (Wu ⫺ Wn )/g,
where the denominator g is the attenuation coefficient (i.e., one minus the
bias). For example, if 25% of individuals have their earnings imputed by
the census (Qu p Q n p .25) and the donor mixes are equal, then union gap
estimates should be adjusted upward by a third (1/(1 ⫺ .25) p 1.333) from,
say, .15 to .20. In practice, researchers have information on Qu and Qn but
not on the donor mix ru and rn. The latter can be self-generated, as we will
see, by implementing one’s own imputation procedure.
To understand more fully the nature of match bias, we offer a simple
example. Once again, assume equivalent rates of nonresponse and donor
mix for union and nonunion respondents so that the bias formula QG
applies. Assume that 10% of private sector workers are union members,
that there is a .20 log wage gap between union and nonunion workers,
and that 25% of workers in the CPS have earnings allocated, with union
status not a match criterion. In selecting donors for those with missing
earnings, let 10% of union nonrespondents be matched to union donors
and 90% to nonunion donors. Likewise, among nonunion workers with
missing earnings, let 90% be matched to nonunion donors and 10% to
union donors. Union workers with imputed earnings have their earnings
understated by .18 (.90 times the .20 union wage differential) so that the
average of union earnings for those with and without imputed earnings
is understated by .045 (.25 imputed earners times .18). Turning to nonunion workers with imputed earnings, their earnings are overstated by
.02 (.10 times the .20 union differential) and so the average of nonunion
earnings is overstated by .005 (.25 imputed earners times .02). Taken
together, the measured union-nonunion wage differential is .15 rather than
.20, biased downward by .05 due to the understatement of union earnings
(.045) and overstatement of nonunion earnings (.005). Stated alternatively,
with bias B p QG p .05, attenuation of G is equal to Q p .25 and the
attenuation coefficient is g p (1 ⫺ Q) p .75 . For the 25% of the sample
with earnings imputed, there exists no union wage gap.8
8

Although Card does not identify or discuss the issue of match bias, he points
out in a footnote: “For simplicity, I have deleted all observations with imputed
earnings data. . . . The union wage gap for men with allocated earnings is roughly
0” (Card 1996, p. 968, n. 22).
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Table 1
Sensitivity of Match Bias to Alternative Assumptions
Line
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

ru

rn

Qu

Qn

G

B

g

.10
.10
.10
.10
.18
.18
.50
1.00
.180

.10
.10
.10
.10
.09
.09
.03
.00
.091

.25
.26
.30
.20
.25
.30
.26
.26
.265

.25
.24
.20
.30
.25
.20
.24
.24
.257

.20
.20
.20
.20
.20
.20
.20
.20
.20

.0500
.0516
.0580
.0420
.0455
.0528
.0274
.0000
.0481

.750
.742
.710
.790
.773
.736
.863
1.000
.759

Note.—Match bias is calculated by B p [(1 ⫺ ru)Qu ⫹ rnQn]G, where ru p proportion union donors assigned to union nonrespondents, rn p proportion union donors assigned to nonunion nonrespondents,
Qu p proportion of union workers with imputed earnings, Qn p proportion of nonunion workers with
imputed earnings, and G p Wu ⫺ Wn, the unbiased union-nonunion log wage gap. The attenuation coefficient
is calculated as g p 1 ⫺ [(1 ⫺ ru)Qu ⫹ rnQn]; the biased wage gap equals gG. Line 9 utilizes the values of r
and Q obtained in subsequent analysis. B and g are strictly valid only for mean wage gaps absent covariates.
Bias is exacerbated in a wage regression framework if union status is correlated with other covariates (see
text).

In table 1, we examine how sensitive match bias, as shown in equation
(4), is to changes in imputation rates and donor mix. The illustrative
example discussed above is seen in line 1. Imputation rates of .25 for
union and nonunion workers, an equal donor mix of 10% union, and an
unbiased wage gap of .20 lead to downward bias of .05 log points and
an attenuation coefficient of .75. Evident from lines 2–4 of table 1 is that
an increase (decrease) in the union relative to nonunion imputation rate
increases (decreases) bias, given a union proportion in the donor mix of
less than .50. In lines 5–6 of the table , the mitigating effect of a differential
donor mix is seen. If union workers are matched to donors of whom
18% are union and if nonunion workers are matched to 9% union workers, bias falls from .05 in line 1 to .046 in line 5. Were union workers
matched to 50% union donors and nonunion workers to 3% union donors (with imputation rates of .26 and .24), bias would decline to .027
(line 7). Line 8 demonstrates that, if union status is an explicit match
criterion (ru p 1, rn p 0), there is no match bias.
Included in line 9 are the actual imputation rates in our 1996–2001 CPS
sample (Qu p .265, Q n p .257) and the donor mix subsequently obtained
using our own hot deck procedure (ru p .180, rn p .091). Predicted
match bias is .048, and the attenuation coefficient is .759, which is close
to the values from the simple approximation in line 1. Recall that the bias
shown to this point applies to mean differences in union and nonunion
log wages, that is, wage gaps absent covariates.9
9

Although the focus here is on cross-sectional studies, similar match bias exists
for longitudinal studies examining the correlation between wage change and the
change in union status (or other non–match attributes). If earnings are imputed
in both years 1 and 2, the bias can be approximated by QG, just as in the cross-
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IV. Match Bias as a Form of Measurement Error: Attenuation with
Regression Covariates
In the previous section, we identified match bias absent covariates. In
a wage regression including union status plus correlated covariates, identifying match bias is not straightforward. Recasting match bias as a form
of misclassification or measurement error in the right-hand-side union
variable rather than error in the left-hand-side wage variable correlated
with union status permits us to address this issue based on existing literature.10 Indeed, the match bias measure we provided in the previous
section is equivalent to the measure given for attenuation bias due to
misclassification of a binary variable (union status), absent covariates or
assuming zero correlation between union status and covariates (Aigner
1973, p. 53, eq. [11]; Freeman 1984, p. 8, eq. [9]).
The logic is as follows. The census hot deck procedure matches an
earnings nonrespondent with an earnings donor identical with respect to
match characteristics but not non–match characteristics such as union
status. Donor earnings on the left-hand side can be treated as a valid
observation whose right-hand side characteristics, apart from union status
(or other non–match attributes), are measured without error. The regression then includes valid donor observations whose misclassified union
status produces a biased estimate of the union wage gap. Identification
of measurement error bias in the union coefficient thus provides an estimate of the match bias from earnings imputation within a regression
framework.11
sectional analysis, assuming that Q is the sample proportion with earnings imputed
in both years. Among workers whose earnings are imputed in both years, there
will be zero correlation between earnings change and union status change. For
those whose earnings are imputed in year 1 only, the extent of bias depends on
whether one is a union joiner (U01) or leaver (U10). Estimated wage gaps for joiners
would show little bias since roughly 90% of imputed earners are correctly matched
to nonunion donors in year 1. Bias would be substantial for leavers, since only
about 10% of imputed earners are correctly matched to union donors in year 1.
If earnings are imputed in year 2 only, the opposite scenario occurs, with a
substantial bias for union joiners and a minor bias for leavers. Imputation can
either mitigate or exacerbate measurement error bias toward zero resulting from
misclassified union status, depending on whether or not imputed earners with
misclassified union status are matched to an earnings donor with the same measured union status. Longitudinal studies that examine misclassification bias in
union status include Freeman (1984), Card (1996), and Hirsch and Schumacher
(1998).
10
We thank Thomas Lemieux and Chris Bollinger for providing this insight,
along with guidance on the appropriate literature.
11
We ignore several complications. Although most explanatory variables are
included in the census match list, there will exist measurement error among donor
observations for covariates that are not match criteria (e.g., industry status). Second, donors are obtained from the CPS and may be included twice in the re-
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The classical errors-in-variables approach assumes measurement error
in an explanatory variable x1 that is uncorrelated with its true value.
Although typically a reasonable assumption for a continuous variable, it
is necessarily false for binary variables. If true union status u* p 1, then
the misclassification error in observed union status u must be negative;
if u* p 0, the error must be positive. As shown by Aigner (1973) and
others, the binary errors-in-variables case results in least squares coefficient estimates that are biased toward zero, but with the precise bias
difficult to specify absent additional assumptions. Bollinger (1996) has
established bounds for the true coefficient, with the least squares estimate
providing the lower bound and a variant of reverse regression providing
an upper bound.
Card (1996, pp. 958–60) has identified a measure of attenuation bias
resulting from misclassification error in union status, a measure requiring
external information on the rate of misclassification error. Card’s formulation also accounts for differences in the true but unobserved union
density and the observed union density (these are assumed identical in
Aigner and Freeman). In the context of our match bias problem, true
density can diverge from observed density if one treats the earnings sample
including donors as the true sample. Card’s approach can be readily applied here. Misclassification in union status is a function of census earnings
allocation rates, which we directly measure, and the rates at which union
workers are assigned nonunion donors and nonunion workers assigned
union donors, which we can approximate based on our own hot deck
procedure.
Card first derives the attenuation coefficient measure g0 in the case
where there are no covariates. Following his notation, u* p true but
unobserved union status, indicator variable u p observed union status,
q1 p Pr (u p 1Fu* p 1), q0 p Pr (u p 1Fu* p 0), true union density

gression sample, first as a donor and second as a regular observation. Replicate
observations will lead to downward bias in standard errors. Pairs of replicates
have union misclassification error in the donor observations but not in the paired
regular observations. Third, a separate issue is measurement error bias due to
reporting error in the union status variable. In order to focus on imputation match
bias, we ignore the standard form of measurement error, which is not so large in
wage level analysis. Measurement error has been a focus in longitudinal studies
(Freeman 1984; Bollinger 1996; Card 1996). Farber and Western (2002) note that,
as union density falls below .50, random reporting error biases density upward,
substantially so as density becomes very small (when true density is zero, all bias
is positive). Bias would be in the opposite direction if union density exceeded
.50.
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¯ , and observed density P p u¯ , or P p q1p ⫹ q0 (1 ⫺ p).12 Card
p p u*
(1996, p. 959) shows that
g 0 p p/P 7 [(q1 ⫺ P)/(1 ⫺ P)].

(8)

In practice, g0 yields values very close to our attenuation coefficient,
g p 1 ⫺ [(1 ⫺ ru )Qu ⫹ rnQ n ], which treats the original right-hand-side
sample as the true sample (recall that our measure g is identical to misclassification bias shown in Aigner and Freeman).13 Card (1996, p. 960)
next shows that g1, the attenuation coefficient from misclassification error
with covariates, can be approximated by
g 1 p [g 0 ⫺ R 2 /(q1 ⫺ q0 )]/1 ⫺ R 2,

(9)

where g0 is the attenuation bias absent covariates, (q1 ⫺ q0 ) is one minus
the misclassification errors, and R2 is the explained variance from a regression of observed union status on all other covariates. Using our notation, equation (9) translates to
g 1 p [g 0 ⫺ R 2 /(1 ⫺ (1 ⫺ ru )Qu ⫺ rnQ n )]/1 ⫺ R 2.

(9  )

If union status is correlated with the explanatory variables (i.e., R 2 1 0),
bias from misclassification error is exacerbated by the addition of covariates.14 The intuition is that bias is a function of the error variance divided
by the variance of observed union status, conditional on covariates. Earnings covariates correlated with union status reduce variance in the
denominator.
In subsequent work using a pooled 1996–2001 CPS sample, we regress
union status on other earnings covariates and obtain an R2 of .1136 (much
of the explanatory power results from industry, occupation, and region
dummies). Utilizing the values shown in table 1, line 9, we obtain an
estimate of g 1 p .684, as compared to g p .759 absent covariates or
g 0 p .756 accounting for changes in the sample composition but not
covariates. We later compare predicted rates of attenuation with those
obtained in our empirical work. Results indicate that these match bias
approximations work well in practice and that treatment of left-hand-side
imputation error as a form of right-hand-side measurement error is a
fruitful strategy.
With q0 the “false positive” and (1 ⫺ q1) the “false negative” rate, Card assumes
q0 ! q1. Translating into our earlier notation, (1 ⫺ q1) is equivalent to (1 ⫺ ru)Qu and
q0 is equivalent to rnQn.
13
Using values in line 9 of table 1, we obtain g p .759. Allowing p ( P, Card’s
measure produces g0 p .756.
14
Recall that correlation between union status and covariates included as census
match criteria leads to lower match error and thus decreases attenuation in the mean
wage gap (i.e., an increase in g0).
12
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V. Data Description and CPS Allocation Flags
for Imputed Earnings
In our analysis of union wage gaps, the data sources are the May 1973
through May 1981 CPS and the CPS-ORG earnings files from 1983 to
2001. Subsequent analysis of industry and other sectoral wage differentials
is based on the combined 1996–2001 CPS-ORG sample.
The CPS-ORG earnings files made available to researchers are prepared
by the U.S. Census for use by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which
then makes these files available to the research community. The information provided on the BLS’s CPS earnings files regarding allocated earnings has varied in important ways over time. Table 2 describes these
differences and provides the percentage of earnings records identified as
being allocated. Allocation rates are provided for two samples. First, figures are compiled for all employed wage and salary workers ages 16 and
over with reported positive usual weekly earnings (weekly earnings designated as missing are retained for 1973–78). Second, allocation rates are
compiled for our estimation subsample of private nonagricultural workers.
The May 1973–78 CPS earnings files formed the basis for much early
research on labor unions and industry differentials, among other topics.15
On these files, individuals who do not report earnings are included but
weekly earnings are listed as missing. Hence, researchers using the May
1973–78 CPS to estimate wage equations, knowingly or unknowingly,
exclude allocated earners. As seen in table 2, during the 1973–78 period,
the percentage of wage and salary workers whose weekly earnings are
missing ranges between 18% and 22%. These are primarily workers who
did not report earnings.
Beginning in 1979, imputed earnings were included in the edited earnings field, along with allocation flags designating which individuals have
reported earnings and which imputed earnings. This was true for the
monthly CPS-ORG files, which began in January 1979 but did not yet
include union status information, and for the May 1979, 1980, and 1981
CPS earnings files, which included union status.16 The percentages designated as allocated in our 1979–81 estimation samples are 19% in the
May 1979 half sample and 16% in the May 1980 and 1981 quarter samples.
Allocation rates found for the full-year 1979–82 ORG files (which do
15
Perhaps most important, many of the empirical studies on unionization by
Freeman, Medoff, and their students at Harvard used the May 1973–78 CPS (for
a summary, see Freeman and Medoff [1984]).
16
The May 1979 and 1980 CPS include union status information for all rotation
groups, while the May 1981 CPS includes it for only the quarter sample. Earnings
are reported for only a half sample in May 1979 and for quarter samples in 1980
and 1981. There were no union questions in 1982. Union status questions were
asked every month to a quarter sample (the outgoing rotation groups) beginning
with the January 1983 CPS-ORG.

Table 2
Proportion of CPS Wage and Salary Earners Designated as Allocated,
by Year
Year

All W & S Employees

Private Sector Estimation Sample

1973–78: Nonrespondents included in files with missing earnings; no allocated earnings
designation. Shown below is the Proportion with Missing Weekly Earnings.
1973
.181
.186
1974
.206
.211
1975
.179
.186
1976
.198
.203
1977
.178
.186
1978
.216
.223
1979–88: Nonrespondents have weekly earnings imputed. Files include valid allocation
designation. Shown below is the Proportion Designated as Allocated.
1979
.165*
.187
1980
.158*
.163
1981
.152*
.160
1982
.137*
N.A.
1983
.138
.138
1984
.147
.149
1985
.143
.144
1986
.107
.108
1987
.135
.137
1988
.144
.147
1989–93a: Nonrespondents have weekly earnings imputed. Allocation flag identifies
about one-quarter of allocated earners. Shown below is the Proportion Designated as
Allocated.
1989
.037
.037
1990
.039
.040
1991
.044
.044
1992
.042
.042
1993
.046
.047
1989–93b: Nonrespondents have weekly earnings imputed. Unedited earnings used to
identify allocated earners. Shown below is the Proportion with Missing Values for
Unedited Weekly Earnings.
1989
.148
.150
1990
.150
.154
1991
.153
.155
1994–95 (Aug.): Nonrespondents have weekly earnings imputed. No valid allocation
designation.
1994
N.A.
N.A.
1995 (Jan.–Aug.)
N.A.
N.A.
1995 (Sept.)–current: Nonrespondents have weekly earnings imputed. Files include valid
allocation designation. Shown below is the Proportion Designated as Allocated.
1995 (Sept.–Dec.)
.233
.228
1996
.221
.217
1997
.222
.219
1998
.236
.232
1999
.276
.273
2000
.298
.295
2001
.309
.305
Sources.—Data for 1973–81 are from the May CPS Earnings Supplements. Data for 1983–2001 are from
the monthly CPS-ORG earnings files.
Note.—Samples of “All W&S Employees” include all employed wage and salary workers ages 16 and
over with positive values for usual weekly earnings (the 1973–78 samples include those with “missing” weekly
earnings). The “Private Sector Estimation Samples” correspond to analysis presented in table 4 and figs. 1
and 2. Additional restrictions are that observations be private sector nonagricultural wage and salary workers,
with no missing observations on control variables included in the estimated wage equation, and a real wage
between $3.00 and $150. Sample sizes for “All W&S Employees” are an average 50,028 for the years 1973–78
(including those with missing earnings); 25,596 in 1979; 16,085 in 1980; 14,713 in 1981; and an average
168,311 for 1983–2001. Table 4 provides sample sizes for the estimation samples. N.A. p not available.
* The 1979–82 figures for all wage and salary workers are imputation rates in the full-year 1979–82
ORG files (these do not include union status). Rates from the May files used in the analysis are
1979 p .184, 1980 p .159, and 1981 p .161.
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not include union status) are shown in the column for all wage and salary
workers (the table note contains corresponding rates from the May files).
Turning to the CPS-ORG monthly earnings files for 1983–88, allocation
rates were 14%–15% in most years (the exception is 1986).
Beginning in January 1989, earnings allocation flags included in the
CPS-ORG are unreliable. They designate about 4% of workers as having
imputed earnings, which is roughly a quarter of those who in fact had
their earnings allocated. An alternative method exists to identify allocated
earners. The ORG files during these years contain an “unedited” weekly
earnings variable. Those with missing unedited weekly earnings (and valid
edited weekly earnings) are designated as having earnings allocated. Those
with non–missing unedited earnings are assumed to have been earnings
respondents. This method appears to provide a reliable measure of nonresponse for most workers.17 About 15% of workers in our 1989–92
estimation samples are designated as nonrespondents based on this
method. A slightly higher rate (16.7%) is found for 1993.
Following CPS revisions in 1994, there were no usable earnings allocation flags in the ORG files for January 1994 through August 1995 (the
unedited weekly earnings variable is not provided). During September
1995, an accurate allocation flag for the usual weekly earnings variable
was included. For the period September 1995 through 1998, 22%–24%
of individuals had imputed earnings. The substantial increase in earnings
allocation from about 17% in 1993 to 22%–24% in the period 1995–98
is likely to be the result of changes in the CPS. The series of questions
used by the census to form the “edited” usual weekly earnings field became more complex following the 1994 CPS redesign (Polivka and Rothgeb 1993). If a response is missing or replaced on any part of the sequence
of questions, the census utilizes its imputation procedure. Although procedures have been consistent since 1994, there has been a clear and worrisome increase in nonresponse since 1998, with the nonresponse rate in
2001 being 31%.
Table 3 uses the 1996–2001 CPS sample to compare characteristics of
private sector wage and salary workers with and without allocated (imputed) earnings. For the most part, nonrespondents tend to be similar to
respondents among measurable attributes. Allocated earners tend to be a
little older, more likely to reside in the largest cities, and more likely to
be black and to work full time. As expected, nonresponse to the earnings
17
Using unedited earnings to identify allocated earners in 1989–93 was recommended by Lemieux and Card in personal correspondence. We ignore the census
earnings allocation flag for 1989–93, since some workers designated as allocated
have non–missing unedited and edited weekly earnings whose values are equivalent.
Analysis using the 1988 ORG allows one to evaluate the method used for 1989–93,
since one can compare workers identified by missing unedited weekly earnings with
those designated as imputed based on the census earnings allocation flag.
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Table 3
Characteristics of CPS Respondents and Allocated Earners
Variable
Wage (2001 dollars)
Age
Education
Male
Black
Asian
Hispanic
Married with spouse
Separated, divorced, or widowed
MSA, medium
MSA/CMSA, large
Foreign born
Part time
Proxy respondent
Union member
N
Proportion of allocated earners
N

Allocated
Earners

Earnings
Respondents

15.86
39.59
13.23
.535
.120
.047
.087
.541
.163
.399
.403
.138
.142
.613
.098
185,685

15.36
37.64
13.19
.515
.079
.038
.099
.563
.157
.422
.324
.126
.189
.488
.095
533,947

Union

Nonunion

.265
68,937

.257
650,695

Note.—Data are from the 1996–2001 monthly CPS-ORG earnings files. The sample
includes 719,632 private nonagricultural employed wage and salary workers aged 16 and
over.

question is higher when another household member (a proxy) is interviewed, providing a possible instrument for nonreporting in attempts to
account for response bias (Bishop et al. 1999).
The attribute of most concern to us is union status. Union density is
9.5% among respondents versus 9.8% among nonrespondents. Among
union members, 26.5% have their earnings imputed, compared to 25.7%
of nonunion workers. Although these differences are small, the higher
nonresponse rate among union workers as compared with nonunion
workers increases match bias slightly. In general, the similarity in measured characteristics among respondents and nonrespondents suggests that
there may be little bias in earnings function parameters attaching to those
attributes included as imputation match criteria. This is effectively the
result reported by Angrist and Krueger (1999), which was based on wage
regressions from the March CPS, with and without inclusion of allocated
earners.
VI. Union Wage Gap Estimates with and without Match Bias
Correction, 1973–2001
This section compares standard estimates of union wage gaps, with and
without “correction” for match bias. This comparison provides insight
into what has been a puzzle regarding changes in the union premium in
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the late 1970s and early 1980s and into the magnitude of recent declines
in the premium. Table 4 provides estimates of union-nonunion log wage
gaps for all private sector nonagricultural wage and salary workers, with
and without control for standard CPS worker and job characteristics and
with and without inclusion of workers whose earnings are imputed. The
union wage gap without covariates is the difference in mean log wages
for union and nonunion workers. The union gap with covariates is the
coefficient on a union membership dummy variable from a log wage
equation with inclusion of standard control variables. The regression estimates in table 4 are also shown in figure 1, along with the proportions
of workers whose earnings are missing (1973–78) or allocated (beginning
in 1979).
Hourly earnings are defined as usual weekly earnings divided by usual
hours worked per week. Top-coded earnings (at $999 in 1973–88, $1,923
in 1989–97, and $2,885 in 1998–2001) are assigned the mean above the
cap, based on the assumption that the upper tail of the earnings distribution follows a Pareto distribution.18 Omitted for quality control are a
small number of workers with implicit wages less than $3.00 and greater
than $150 (in 2001 dollars). Controls included are years of schooling,
potential experience and its square (interacted with gender), dummy variables for gender, race, and ethnicity (3), marital status (2), part-time status,
region (8), large metropolitan area, industry (8), and occupation (12).19
In what follows, we characterize estimates from the full sample, including
allocated earners, as “not corrected” for match bias. Estimates from samples
in which allocated earners are excluded (in those years possible) are characterized as “corrected.” For the years 1994–95, where allocated earners
cannot be identified, we provide estimates of what the union gap would
be were it estimated for a sample with allocated earners excluded. This is
done by adjusting the 1994–95 gaps upward by .043 log points, the average
difference for 1996–98 in estimates with and without allocated earners.20 In
18
Estimates of gender-specific means above the cap for 1973–2001 are shown in
Hirsch and Macpherson (2002, p. 6). These values are approximately 1.5 times the
cap, with somewhat smaller female than male means and modest growth over time.
For observations with non–positive usual hours worked per week or “variable
hours” after 1994, we use hours worked the previous week. Absent information
on hours worked, observations are dropped.
19
Ignored are issues such as specification, the endogeneity of union status, differences between nonmember covered and not covered, unmeasured worker and
job attributes, and employer-employee selection on skills and tastes (e.g., Card 1996;
Hirsch and Schumacher 1998).
20
In an earlier version of this article, prior to our identifying nonrespondents in
1989–93 (see n. 16), “corrected” regression estimates for 1989–93 were obtained by
adjusting upward the “not corrected” gap estimates by .031 log points, the 1983–88
average difference between estimates including and excluding allocated earners. For
the years 1973–78, it is possible to approximate what estimated union gaps would

Table 4
Private Sector Union Log Wage Differentials, with and without Controls
and Adjustment for Imputation Match Bias, 1973–2001
Unadjusted Wage Gaps without Controls

1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1995P
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

Not Corrected
for
Match Bias

Corrected
for
Match Bias

.270
.304
.312

.309
.310
.314
.315
.362
.357
.319
.347
.364

.323
.321
.318
.311
.302
.296
.296
.268
.255
.254
.265
.253
.235
.227
.234
.240
.223
.201
.191
.183

.366
.365
.359
.343
.345
.336
.336
.310
.298
.293
.310
.303*
.285*
.280
.286
.288
.272
.265
.244
.243

Regression Wage Gaps with Controls
Not Corrected
for
Match Bias

Corrected
for
Match Bias

Observed
Attenuation

.848
.877
.855

.148
.162
.150

.161
.161
.176
.186
.214
.205
.180
.193
.186

.819
.838
.807

.882
.880
.887
.905
.878
.881
.882
.865
.854
.866
.854
.835
.825
.811
.817
.833
.820
.761
.782
.752

.194
.201
.197
.190
.182
.173
.188
.171
.168
.172
.180
.179
.174
.165
.166
.169
.158
.139
.137
.128

.227
.233
.231
.214
.215
.204
.218
.206
.202
.203
.217
.222*
.217*
.208
.211
.209
.202
.199
.186
.182

.853
.862
.853
.889
.847
.847
.862
.833
.830
.850
.830
.806
.801
.791
.784
.808
.784
.697
.738
.703

Observed
Attenuation

Note.—Data for 1973–81 are from the May CPS Earnings Supplements and for 1983–2001 from the
monthly CPS-ORG earnings files. There was no union status variable in 1982. The sample includes
employed private sector nonagricultural wage and salary workers aged 16 and over with positive weekly
earnings and non–missing data for control variables (few observations are lost). The raw wage gap is the
difference in mean log wages for union and nonunion workers. The regression wage gap is the coefficient
on a dummy variable for union membership in a regression where the log of hourly earnings is the
dependent variable. Control variables included are years of schooling; experience and its square (allowed
to vary by gender); and dummy variables for gender, race, and ethnicity (3); marital status (2); part-time
status; region (8); large metropolitan area; industry (8); and occupation (12). Columns labeled “Not
Corrected for Match Bias” include the full sample (workers with and without earnings allocated) for the
years 1979–2001. Columns labeled “Corrected for Match Bias” attempt to include only workers reporting
earnings. Columns labeled “Observed Attenuation” present the ratio of the uncorrected union gap to
the corrected union gap (calculated prior to rounding). All allocated earners are identified and excluded
for the years 1973–88 and 1996–2001. During the period 1989–95, allocation flags are either unreliable
(1989–93) or not available (1994 through August 1995). For 1989–93, allocated earners are identified by
a missing unedited weekly earnings variable. For 1994–95, the corrected gap (designated by *) is adjusted
upward by the bias during 1996–98 (.050 for the raw gap and .043 for the regression gap). The 1995P is
for the partial year, September–December. Sample sizes are an average 32,102 for 1973–78 for the samples
without allocated earners; for the samples including allocated earners, 20,446 in 1979, 12,804 in 1980,
11,833 in 1981, and an average 133,613 for 1983–2001. See table 2 for the proportion of allocated earners.
Standard errors for the regression estimates are an average .006 for the years 1973–78, .007 in 1979, .009
in 1980, .009 in 1981, and an average .004 for 1983–2001.
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Fig. 1.—Private sector union-nonunion wage gaps and earnings allocation rates. For details on estimation, see table 4 and discussion in the text. Each
wage gap series is time consistent, the squared line correcting approximately for match bias by omitting allocated earners, and the line with diamonds
including allocated earners and match bias. Researchers who use all valid earnings records in CPS files would obtain wage gap estimates similar to the
squares for 1973–78, when CPS files do not include imputed earnings, and the diamonds beginning in 1979, when CPS files include imputed earnings
values. The 1978–79 dashed line connects the two series. In 1994–95, allocated earners cannot be excluded and the corrected gaps (the white squares) are
based on an approximation of the bias (see table 4 and the text). The 1973–78 series (shown with asterisks) designates the proportion of the private sector
estimation sample with missing earnings. The proportion of the estimation sample with earnings allocated in each year is designated by the triangles. The
allocation rate for 1989 to 1993 is defined as the proportion with a missing value for unedited weekly earnings and a valid value of edited earnings. The
allocation rate for 1995 is shown for September–December only, the months with valid allocation flags. Allocation rates for 1994 and full-year 1995 are
not available.
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a later section, wage gap estimates are presented in which the full sample
is included but with nonrespondent earnings assigned by us using hot-deck
imputation in which union status is an explicit match criterion. Following
that analysis, we conclude that estimating union gaps based on the respondent sample only (i.e., excluding allocated earners) is a simple and
reasonable approach but that it fails to fully account for the understatement
in relative union wages owing to match bias. In addition, both the “corrected” and “not corrected” sets of estimates may contain some unknown
degree of nonignorable response bias.21
Our analysis helps resolve what has long been a puzzle in the literature—the large decline in estimated union wage gaps between 1978 and
1979 (Freeman 1986; Lewis 1986). Researchers who have included all valid
earnings records have unknowingly excluded nonrespondents during May
1973–78 but have included them in years since 1979. For example, using
the standard approach, our estimates indicate a 6 percentage point decline
in the private sector union gap between those years, from .205 in 1978
to .148 in 1979 (the dotted line in fig. 1). Exclusion of allocated earners
in 1979 eliminates match bias and produces time-consistent estimates between 1973–78 and later years. We obtain an estimate for May 1979 of
.180, a more modest .025 decline from the .205 estimate for 1978. Although
these results are not entirely consistent with changes seen in contract data
(Freeman 1986), any remaining discrepancy can be readily reconciled by
the relatively small sizes or possible nonrepresentativeness of the May
samples (for further attempts at explanation, see Freeman [1986]). The
corrected wage gap pattern seen in figure 1 does make economic sense,
since 1979 was a period with much unanticipated inflation and contractual
union wages may not have adjusted upward so quickly as did nonunion
wages.22
Although there is a general consensus that union wage effects rose in
the mid- and late-1970s (at least through 1978), there is disagreement over
whether union wage premiums were maintained in the early 1980s and
whether or not premiums have declined in recent years. As seen in figure
1, the “corrected” union wage gap series indicates clearly higher premiums
in 1983–85 than in 1977–78. This pattern is consistent with contract data
be had the sample included those with imputed earnings. This was done in the
earlier version by subtracting .033 log points from the “corrected” 1973–78 regression estimates, .033 being the average difference in the two series during 1979–81.
21
If the earnings of nonrespondents differ in ways not accounted for by measurable variables, neither sample contains accurate information on the earnings of
nonrespondents, the one sample omitting nonrespondents and the other matching
them to donors that differ from them in an unknown manner. As stated previously,
the match bias considered in this article exists even if nonresponse is random.
22
Inflation during 1979 (December 1978 to December 1979) was 13.3%, as measured by the CPI-U. When used, COLAs did not provide full adjustment for
inflation.
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(Freeman 1986) and evidence from the BLS Employment Cost Index
(Hirsch et al. 2004). Such a conclusion would not follow using uncorrected
CPS estimates, since one obtains wage gaps for 1973–78 similar to the
“squares” in figure 1, followed by a drop down to the “diamonds” for
1979 forward.
More recently, the uncorrected CPS data indicate a sizable decline in
the gap since the early 1990s. For example, the premium between 1993
and 2001 drops by .052 log points, from .180 to .128. Part of this decline,
however, reflects recent increases in the proportion of allocated earners.
During the same 1993–2001 period, the corrected series declines .035 log
points, from .217 to .182. Hence, use of the uncorrected CPS will cause
researchers to overstate the decline in relative union-nonunion wages. As
seen in table 4, CPS wage gaps absent controls indicate an even larger
closing of union wage differentials than do the regression results.23 Such
closing is similar to that seen in the BLS Employment Cost Index (ECI),
although the ECI has fixed industry-occupation weights. The BLS Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC), which uses current
weights, surprisingly reveals no pattern in relative union wages. Reconciliation of CPS, ECI, and ECEC differences is beyond the scope of this
article.24
Absent correction for imputation match bias, one would not only overstate the decline in the union premium since 1994 but also find it difficult
to distinguish between real year-to-year changes in the union gap and
variation due to changes in the number and composition of allocated
earners. For example, the full-sample union gap drops sharply between
1998 and 1999 and then shows little change in the next year. But the initial
drop was the result of the large increase in allocated earners between 1998
and 1999. The corrected wage gap series shows little change in the wage
gap in the period 1998–99 and a modest decline the following year. Similarly, an increase in allocated earners in 2001 causes the uncorrected CPS
series to overstate the decline in the union wage gap.
VII. Predicted versus Observed Attenuation in Wage Gap Estimates
Match bias resulting from imputed earnings is readily evident in both
the unadjusted and regression-based union wage gaps. Prior to 1994, the
regression gaps appear biased downward by about .03 log points—an
average .031 during 1983–88 and .033 during 1989–93. Since 1994, inclu23
In January issues of Employment and Earnings, BLS publishes median weekly
earnings for union and nonunion full-time workers based on the CPS-ORG files.
For the reasons outlined in this article, these figures should understate union-nonunion earnings differences.
24
Hirsch, Macpherson, and Schumacher (2004) attempt to reconcile union-nonunion wage growth patterns in the CPS, ECI, and ECEC. They uncover numerous
puzzles but find few solutions. They have the most confidence in CPS estimates.
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sion of allocated earners causes a more substantial understatement in union
gaps, an average .043 log points in 1996–98 and .054 in 1999–2001. The
large bias in recent years is in line with expectations, given the increase
in the proportion of allocated earners (see the triangles in fig. 1).
We earlier presented match bias and attenuation coefficient measures
for cases absent covariates (eq. [4]) and with covariates (eq. [9 ]). Both
measures require information not generally available to researchers (i.e.,
rates of donor mismatch). We also suggested (see eqq. [6] and [6 ]) that
GG might provide a rough approximation of the match bias associated
with wage gap estimates or, equivalently, that the attenuation coefficient
can be approximated by g ≈ (1 ⫺ Q). Does (1 ⫺ Q) provide a good approximation of match bias attenuation? This cannot be answered definitively since G, the unbiased union gap, is not known precisely if there
is nonignorable response bias or if union gaps differ for the included and
excluded samples. We can assess, however, whether the ratio of the union
gaps with and without allocated earners is roughly equal to (1 ⫺ Q). For
example, in 1983, the proportion imputed is .138, and so 1 ⫺ Q p .862.
The ratio of the 1983 regression wage gaps is .194/.227 p .853, which is
very close to 1 ⫺ Q. In 2001, with allocation rate Q p .305 and 1 ⫺
Q p .695, we obtain a wage ratio .128/.182 p .703, which is again nearly
identical to 1 ⫺ Q. Figure 2 compares the predicted and observed rates of
attenuation by year over the entire 1979–2001 period (ignoring 1994 and
using September–December 1995 results). As seen in figure 2, the simple
attenuation estimate 1 ⫺ Q tracks observed attenuation remarkably well.
It has a mean absolute deviation from the annual wage gap ratio of only
.013.25
We also calculated predicted attenuation rates from equation (4), based
on union-specific imputation rates and estimated rates of donor match,
based on our own hot-deck procedure.26 The mean absolute prediction
error using the equation (4) measure was .019, a little larger than that
seen from equation (6). Equation (4) tended to slightly underpredict
match bias (average deviation of the attenuation coefficient was .017), as
should be expected from both equations (4) and (6).
What makes these results intriguing is that regression match bias, given
covariates, ought to have been larger than Q. The puzzle is why 1 ⫺ Q
25
Note that the deviation in predicted and observed attenuation is not the
difference in the log wage gap. If the wage gap absent attenuation were .20, then
the prediction error would be .013 times .20, or .0026 log points. In contrast to
the mean absolute deviation, the mean deviation is effectively zero (⫺.0004).
26
Union imputation rates are similar or slightly higher than nonunion rates.
Based on our hot deck procedure, match of a union donor to union nonrespondents (ru) is about twice as likely as a union match to nonunion nonrespondents
(rn). Both rates fell steadily between 1979–81 and 2001, ru from .344 to .160 and
rn from .173 to .088.

Fig. 2.—Predicted and observed attenuation. Shown are the predicted and observed attenuation rates by year. An attenuation coefficient of 0 implies
complete attenuation (bias), and a value of 1.0 implies no attenuation (bias). The observed attenuation coefficient is the ratio of the union coefficients with
and without allocated earners included in the sample. Equation (6) measures attenuation by g p 1 ⫺ Q , where Q is the full sample proportion of allocated
earners. Equation (9), adapted from Card (1996), measures attenuation in the presence of covariates by g1 p {g0 ⫺ R2/[1 ⫺ (1 ⫺ ru)Qu ⫺ rnQn]}/1 ⫺ R2. See
the text for explanation. There is no way to identify allocated earners in 1994. The observation for 1995 uses the September–December samples, which
contain reliable allocation flags.
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tracks closely the observed attenuation, rather than being systematically
too high (i.e., understating bias). Figure 2 shows the predicted attenuation,
given regression covariates, based on Card’s (1996) measurement error
attenuation coefficient g1 (eq. [9]). These are calculated based on unionspecific imputation rates, estimates of donor match, and the R2s from
regressions of union status on other covariates (all components of [4],
[6], and [9] are available on request). As seen in figure 2, annual measures
of g1, which should best predict attenuation, instead overstate observed
differences in union gaps estimated from samples with and without allocated earners. The mean absolute difference between observed attenuation and that predicted from equation (9) is an average .046 over the
1979–2001 period, substantially larger than the average error of .013 based
on 1 ⫺ Q.
Additional information is needed to sort out this puzzle. Is the attenuation coefficient g1 from Card a poor predictor of true match bias? Are
our estimates of g1 too high owing to differences in the actual but unreported union status of donors in the CPS and our estimates of donor
mismatch rates? Or are the measures of predicted attenuation based on
g1 approximately correct, implying that actual match bias is even greater
than the observed difference between the estimates from samples with
and without allocated earners? In the next section, we conduct our own
imputation procedure, which permits us to draw inferences regarding the
reliability of the Card measure. Although we cannot answer the above
questions with certainty, we conclude that the third explanation is the
most likely one. True attenuation from match bias appears to be larger
than the observed attenuation based on samples with and without allocated earners. The sample of allocated earners, omitted from the corrected
sample, may have an unobserved union wage advantage larger than that
seen for the sample that reports earnings.
VIII. Results Using Alternative Imputation Matching Criteria
This article has argued that census earnings imputation causes estimates
of wage differentials to be biased downward when the attribute being
studied is not used as an imputation match criterion. The bias is sizable
for the measurement of relative union-nonunion earnings, causing recent
union wage gaps to be understated by at least 5 percentage points. In this
section, an alternative hot deck imputation procedure is implemented.
Instead of using census imputation values, wage values are obtained using
simple hot deck matching methods, with and without union status as a
match criterion. The purpose of this exercise is threefold. First, it demonstrates whether the large discrepancy between estimated wage gaps with
and without the inclusion of allocated earners is in fact the result of union
status being excluded as a match criterion. Second, union gap estimates
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obtained when allocated earners are excluded can be compared with results
obtained for the full sample using an imputation method with union as
a match criterion. Third, information is gathered on the mix of donors
matched to union and nonunion nonrespondents, which allows us to
calculate and compare expected and observed attenuation.
A cell hot deck imputation procedure is used. It includes 240 cells
classified by gender (2 groups), age (4), education (3), occupation (5), and
full- or part-time status (2). These 240 classifications are less detailed than
the census hot deck procedure using 14,976 cells. The limited number of
cells insures that a match for all nonrespondents is found, it eases the
computational burden, and it permits the use of multiple imputation since
there are generally many possible donors in a cell. Our program assigns
a log real wage to nonrespondents (i.e., those whose earnings have been
imputed by the census) by randomly selecting a donor from among all
those with exactly the same combination of characteristics. In order to
account for variability in match values, 50 imputation rounds for each
individual, with replacement, are performed. A second hot deck imputation procedure is then performed, identical to that described above
except that it adds union membership as a match criterion, thus resulting
in 480 combinations or cells. Union wage gaps using the 50 alternative
data sets are then estimated. Reported in table 5 are the union coefficient
estimates based on the first round of hot decking (and its standard error),
as well as the mean and standard deviation of the 50 coefficient estimates.
Results are summarized in table 5. We use data from a sample of private
sector workers in the 1996–2001 CPS-ORG files (n p 719,632; see the
table note for a list of control variables).27 Based on the census imputation
procedure, we obtain a “full sample” union log wage gap of .145. When
we exclude the 25.8% of the sample with allocated earnings, the estimated
wage gap rises .05 log points to .193. When we use our own multiple hot
deck procedure, without union status as a match criterion, we obtain a
log gap of .141, which is very close to the value obtained based on the
more detailed census procedure. When we add union status as a match
criterion (i.e., move from 240 to 480 match cells), a (nearly) full sample
union log wage gap of .208 results, somewhat higher than the .193 gap
obtained by simply omitting allocated earners from the sample. For estimates with and without union status as a match criterion, the estimated
27

Results in this section are presented based on multiple hot deck imputation
using the pooled 1996–2001 sample. In the previous section, predicted attenuation
rates (fig. 2) are based on donor match rates (ru and rn) obtained from a single
hot deck imputation by year for 1983–93, September–December 1995, and
1996–2001. Because of small samples, donor rates for May 1979–81 are based on
imputation using a combined sample.
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Table 5
Union Wage Gap Estimates Using Alternative Hot Deck Imputation
Methods with and without Union Status as a Match Criterion, 1996–2001

CPS imputation:
Coefficient
Standard error
R2
N

Multiple imputation, 50 rounds:
Round 1 earnings data
Round 1 standard error
R2
Mean gap across 50 sets
Standard deviation of coefficients
N

All Workers, Census
Hot Deck Method,
Excludes Union as
Match Criterion

Excludes Workers with
Census Imputation

.1452
(.0018)
.473
719,632

.1928
(.0020)
.517
533,947

All Workers, Own
Hot Deck Method,
Excludes Union Status
as Match Criterion

All Workers, Own Hot
Deck Method,
Includes Union Status
as Match Criterion

.1410
(.0018)
.464
.1396
(.0010)
719,632

.2081
(.0018)
.471
.2073
(.0009)
719,629

Note.—Data are from the 1996–2001 monthly CPS-ORG files. All regression wage gap estimates are
from an identical specification including schooling; experience and its square (allowed to vary by gender);
and dummy variables for gender, race and ethnicity (3), marital status (2), part-time status, foreign born,
veteran status, region (8), large metropolitan area (2), industry (8), occupation (12), and year (3). This is
the same sample and specification used subsequently in table 6. The top panel relies on the census cell
hot deck imputation method with 14,976 cells but excluding union status as a match criterion. The sample
in the left column includes allocated earners. The right column “corrects” for imputation bias by excluding
allocated earners. The bottom panel relies on the authors’ multiple imputation hot deck procedure described in the text. In the left column, nonrespondent earnings are imputed using 240 cells, where union
status is not a match criterion. In the right column, match bias is corrected by using 480 cells, with union
status as a match criterion. No donors were found for three union nonrespondents. The coefficients and
standard errors shown are those obtained based on earnings values from the first of 50 hot deck imputation
rounds. Also presented are the means and standard deviations of the union coefficients across regressions
using the 50 sets of earnings data.

gap from round 1 is similar to the mean union gap across the 50 rounds,
reflecting little variation across the 50 sets of earnings data.28
Using our own imputation scheme provides us with information on
the union status of donors and the extent to which match bias is mitigated.
For the first round of the analysis (corresponding to the point estimate
shown in table 5), nonunion nonrespondents are matched to donors who
are 9.1% union, while union nonrespondents are matched to 18.0% union
(the sample mean among respondents or potential donors is 9.5% union).
28
The R2 values in table 5 are as expected. The full sample with census imputation (top left panel) yields a slightly higher R2 than our hot deck method
without union as a match criterion but one that is less than our method with
union as a criterion. All of the full-sample R2 s are less than the R2 with allocated
earners excluded from the sample.
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As seen in table 1, line 9, the predicted attenuation coefficient, absent
covariates, is g p .759 (eq. [4]); with covariates, it is g 1 p .684 (eq. [9]).
Observed attenuation is found to be nearly identical to that predicted.
Focusing on unadjusted wage gaps using our own imputation procedures
(results not shown), we find a union-nonunion gap of .203 without union
status as a match criterion and a gap of .265 with union as a match
criterion. The implied attenuation coefficient is .2025/.2648 p .765, which
is highly similar to the predicted .759 attenuation. This compares to an
attenuation coefficient of .2105/.2657 p .792 based on unadjusted union
gaps from the census samples with and without allocated earners.
The regression attenuation seen in the bottom half of table 5 is
.1410/.2081 p .678, which is again nearly identical to the g 1 p .684 predicted based on observed donor match rates and the correlation between
union density and the regression covariates. In short, the Card measure
of attenuation (eq. [9]) predicts extremely well, when evaluated in an
appropriate manner (i.e., based on alternative estimates from the full sample with and without “measurement error”). We observe less attenuation,
.1452/.1928 p .753, using the CPS samples with and without allocated
earners.
The results shown in table 5 confirm that it is the exclusion of union
status as a match criterion that accounts for the large difference in union
gap estimates between the samples with and without the inclusion of
allocated earners. Similar results using the census procedure and our hot
deck procedure (the left column of table 5) suggests that our simple imputation method provides matches roughly similar to those in the CPS
and yields meaningful information on match donor rates ru and rn, information not available from the census.
The question remains why the g1 measure of attenuation, which accounts for the presence of covariates, predicts observed attenuation in
samples with and without allocated earners far less well than does the
simple approximation 1⫺Q (see fig. 2). Based on results in table 5, we
concluded that g1 is a reliable measure of attenuation when tested correctly.
Thus, two possible explanations remain. Part of the explanation could
reflect more precise donor match rates using census matching than with
our simpler method (i.e., a higher likelihood of matching a union donor
to a union nonrespondent and vice versa). Reasonable changes in the
values of ru and rn, however, have too small an impact on g1 to account
for the difference. The alternative explanation is that nonrespondents in
the CPS are not fully representative, with there being a higher than average
(but unobserved) union wage gap among the omitted sample of allocated
earners than among the observable sample of respondents.29
29

A separate issue is the possibility of response bias. We estimate a Heckman
selection model in which earnings response (i.e., no imputation) is a function of
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In short, we have found that the simple method of omitting allocated
earners from the estimation sample provides a “reasonable,” although not
ideal, approximation of a wage gap estimate purged of match bias. Observed attenuation based on samples with and without allocated earners
is closely approximated by the aggregate rate of imputation (in the case
of the 1996–2001 sample, Q p .258 or g p 1 ⫺ Q p .742). True attenuation, at least in the case of union wage gaps, is somewhat larger. Whether
or not the same conclusion would apply to other wage determinants is
not examined here. The analysis in this section simply reinforces the
central point of this article. Census earnings imputation causes a substantial attenuation in wage gap estimates for non–match criteria. Match
bias warrants attention from researchers conducting empirical analysis.
IX. Sectoral and Other Wage Differentials
Neither industry of employment nor class of worker (i.e., private, federal, state, and local) is used as a match criterion in the census cell hot
deck earnings imputation procedure. Thus, estimates of wage differences
across employment sectors should be biased downward in a manner similar to that seen for union status. Below, we briefly examine industry wage
dispersion, public sector wage differentials, and wage differentials associated with other non–match attributes.
We do not attempt here to explore the source of industry differences
in earnings. Our own reading of the literature suggests that much of the
dispersion in industry wages reflects the matching of highly skilled workers to high-productivity and high-wage workplaces. That being said, large
wage differences across industries show up in cross-sectional wage regressions with standard and augmented sets of control variables, and longitudinal analysis finds individual wage changes associated with changes
in industry.30 Regardless of one’s interpretation of the evidence, the size
of measured industry wage differentials is understated by the inclusion
of workers with imputed earnings.
We estimate log wage equations using the CPS-ORG files for
all wage determinants plus the “proxy” variable designating if another household
member provided survey information. Proxy is a highly important determinant
of nonresponse, but a relatively unimportant determinant of the wage (proxy has
a ⫺.02 coefficient in the wage equation). In principle, the selection model should
account for response bias. The union gap from the selectivity-adjusted MLE wage
equation is .1916 (.0020), as compared to .1928 (.0020) obtained by OLS for the
sample excluding allocated earners and to .2081 (.0018) obtained with the full
sample using our own hot deck imputation with union as a match criterion.
Bishop, Formby, and Thistle (1999) have used proxy status as an instrument for
earnings imputation in order to measure the response bias in earnings using the
March CPS. They do not consider the match bias that is the focus of our article.
30
Among the articles in this literature, see Dickens and Katz (1987), Krueger
and Summers (1988), Gibbons and Katz (1992), Helwege (1992), and Kim (1998).
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1996–2001, with and without the inclusion of allocated earners. We include
a similar set of controls as in the union analysis, except that 27 industry
dummies are now included, with mining the reference group (full results
are available on request). We measure dispersion in log wages across the
28 industries (with a zero base for mining) by, alternatively, the standard
deviation and the mean absolute deviation.
As expected, measured dispersion across industries is substantially
higher when allocated earners are excluded than when included. As seen
in table 6, the standard deviation is .131 with allocated earners excluded,
compared to .103 for the full sample, an understatement in dispersion of
21.4%. A similar result is found using the mean absolute deviation, .096,
with allocated earners excluded versus .076, with them included, which
is a 20.8% understatement. In results not shown, a similar pattern is found
during earlier years, although bias is less severe owing to a lower proportion of allocated earnings records.
Table 6 also provides estimates of public sector differentials, comparing
non-postal-federal, postal, state, and local worker wages to those for
workers with similar measured characteristics across the entire private
sector.31 In each case, estimated gaps including allocated earners are biased
toward zero. The column labeled “Observed Attenuation” provides the
ratio of the full-sample result to the result with allocated earners omitted.
Bias in the postal-private gap estimate is particularly large, with a log
differential of .255 obtained among those reporting earnings versus a
biased measure of .188 from a sample of workers including allocated
earners.
In addition to industry and public sector differentials, table 6 provides
selected wage differentials estimated with and without inclusion of allocated earners. In every case, differentials with respect to attributes not
used as a census match criterion are biased toward zero when allocated
earners are included in the estimation sample. This applies to such wage
correlates as Hispanic, marital status, veteran status, foreign born, and
city size.
X. Conclusion and Implications
Researchers have not given sufficient attention to what can be substantial bias in wage gap estimates owing to earnings imputation by the
census. The “match bias” identified in this article is not the result of
31

In the regressions estimating public sector differentials, we omit controls for
union status and industry, effecting a comparison of public workers with union
and nonunion private workers across all industries. This approach comports well
with comparability laws mandating public sector compensation equivalent to that
for similar levels of work in the private sector. Discussion of the issues involved
is contained in Hirsch et al. (1999).
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Table 6
The Effect of Earnings Imputation on Industry, Public Sector, and Other
Selected Wage Differentials, 1996–2001
Wage Gap Category
Industry wage dispersion:
Standard deviation
Mean absolute deviation
N
Public-private log wage gap:
Federal (nonpostal)
Postal
State government
Local government
N
Log wage gap, selected attributes:
Union
Hispanic
Married, spouse present
Separated, divorced, or widowed
Veteran
Foreign born
MSA 100,000–2.5 million
MSA 1 2.5 million
N

Not Corrected for
Match Bias

Corrected for
Match Bias

Observed
Attenuation

.103
.076
719,632

.131
.096
533,947

.784
.786

.108
(.003)
.188
(.005)
⫺.036
(.002)
⫺.032
(.002)
869,303

.143
(.003)
.255
(.006)
⫺.043
(.002)
⫺.040
(.002)
649,357

.755

.145
(.002)
⫺.089
(.002)
.083
(.001)
.034
(.002)
⫺.021
(.002)
⫺.063
(.002)
.089
(.001)
.190
(.002)
719,632

.193
(.002)
⫺.107
(.002)
.101
(.002)
.041
(.002)
⫺.025
(.002)
⫺.081
(.002)
.109
(.001)
.239
(.002)
533,947

.753

.739
.840
.798

.833
.828
.829
.816
.776
.823
.792

Note.—Data are from the 1996–2001 monthly CPS-ORG earnings files. The column labeled “Corrected” excludes allocated earners from the sample. “Observed Attenuation” is the ratio of the “Not
Corrected” to “Corrected” columns (prior to rounding). The top portion of the table presents the
dispersion in industry wages across the private nonagricultural sector. We report the unweighted standard
deviations and absolute mean deviations for 28 industry classifications (i.e., the log differentials from 27
industry dummies and a zero reference group). Included variables are the same as in table 4, except for
inclusion of a more detailed industry breakdown, foreign born, veteran status, two rather than one city
size dummies, and year dummies. The middle portion of the table is based on a sample of private and
public sector nonagricultural workers. The specification is the same as in the top panel, except for the
inclusion of the public sector dummies and the exclusion of union status and industry dummies (see text
for discussion). The bottom portion of the table reports coefficients from the same regression used
previously in the top portion of table 5. It is identical to that in the top portion of this table, except that
eight rather than 27 industry dummies are included. Standard errors are in parentheses.

response bias nor is it related to improper accounting for the uncertainty
of imputed values. It need not reflect a deficiency in hot deck methods
vis-à-vis alternative imputation approaches (e.g., propensity score matching and multiple imputation). Rather, for an attribute not used as an
imputation match criterion (or, more broadly, not used to predict a missing
wage), wage gap estimates with respect to that attribute are systematically
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biased toward zero. Absent covariates, the match bias is equal to the sum
of match error rates (false negatives plus false positives). Bias is exacerbated
in a regression framework with covariates unless the covariates are uncorrelated with the attribute under study.
In practice, attenuation from match bias can be roughly approximated
by Q, the proportion of allocated earners. In 2001, over 30% of wage and
salary workers had weekly earnings imputed by the census. Excluding
allocated earners from estimation samples appears to provide a simple
and reasonable approach to estimating wage gaps for non–match attributes. Where precision is important, further analysis is warranted. In the
case of the union wage premium, for example, match bias exceeds that
observed by comparing the results from estimation samples with and
without allocated earners.
We have shown that bias from imputed earnings in the estimation of
union and sectoral wage gaps is considerable. The analysis applies to other
wage characteristics studied in the literature that are not census imputation
match criteria. Although not exhaustive, a list of CPS-ORG wage gap
estimates affected by match bias includes ethnicity, immigrant status, marital status, presence and number of children, not-for-profit employment,
veteran status, and city size. In each case, differentials are understated
when allocated earners are included. A similar argument applies to supplements attached to the CPS, which permit study of wage gaps with
respect to company tenure, employer size, job training, displacement, and
shift work. As discussed briefly, match bias affects longitudinal estimates,
albeit in a more complex manner. Earnings imputation should affect measurement of both the level and trend in earnings dispersion, as well as
union effects on inequality. Although this article has focused on the cell
hot deck procedure used in the monthly census earnings files, a similar
(but more complex) match bias exists using the March CPS. And earnings
imputation is not limited to the CPS; it is also used in the National
Longitudinal Survey (NLS), the Panel Study of Income and Program
Dynamics (PSID), the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP), and other household surveys.
It is worth emphasizing that this article is not intended as criticism of
census imputation procedures. We do not argue that the census should
necessarily use industry, union status, or other attributes as match criteria
in their hot deck procedure. The census match variables are firmly based
on a supply side explanation for earnings determination, including demographic, hours, and human capital (schooling, age, occupation) variables.
There is a nontrivial cost to adding variables (cells) to the match procedure,
with cell sizes becoming smaller and a declining probability of finding a
recent donor, let alone a donor living nearby. This is particularly true for
union status since a small proportion of private employees are members.
Alternatives to hot deck matching that incorporate a larger number of
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attributes might well be preferable, but analysis of alternative procedures
lies beyond the scope of our article.32
A principal implication of this article is that researchers need to pay
close attention to how wage differential estimates are affected by the
presence of records with imputed earnings. A few researchers ignore allocated earners because they are unaware of their presence. Most researchers, however, are aware of them but see little cause for concern.
The prevailing view is that, as long as the census does a good job imputing
earnings on average, random individual error in the dependent variable
does not bias coefficient estimates. In practice, including or excluding
allocated earners has not appeared to make much difference, resulting in
highly similar coefficients on schooling, potential experience (i.e., age and
schooling), and other variables that are explicit match criteria (Angrist
and Krueger 1999).
As this article has shown, error in imputing individual earnings is not
random, being correlated with earnings attributes not used as match criteria. The extent of match bias is proportional to the share of the sample
with imputed earnings. Substantial match bias is found for union and
sectoral wage gaps, which is not surprising given that about 30% of
earnings records in the CPS currently contain imputed values. The census
might best improve the quality of research, first, by insuring that reliable
allocation flags are provided with publicly available data sources and,
second, by providing more information to the research community on
the match criteria and methods by which earnings are imputed.
References
Aigner, Dennis J. 1973. Regression with a binary independent variable
subject to errors of observation. Journal of Econometrics 1, no. 1:49–59.
Angrist, Joshua D., and Alan B. Krueger. 1999. Empirical strategies in
labor economics. In Handbook of labor economics, vol. 3A, ed. Orley
C. Ashenfelter and David Card. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Bishop, John A., John P. Formby, and Paul D. Thistle. 1999. Mitigating
earnings imputation bias: Evidence from the CPS. Working Paper no.
9914, East Carolina University, Department of Economics.
Blanchflower, David. 1999. Changes over time in union relative wage
effects in Great Britain and the United States. In The history and practice
of economics: Essays in honour of Bernard Corry and Maurice Peston,
vol. 2, ed. Sami Daniel, Philip Arestis, and John Grahl. Northampton,
MA: Edward Elgar.
32

Lillard et al. (1986) argue that missing earnings should be predicted with an
explicit regression model, with addition of a random term to restore variance.
Given adequate survey information, researchers can implement their preferred
imputation procedure.

Match Bias

721

Bollinger, Christopher R. 1996. Bounding mean regressions when a binary
regressor is mismeasured. Journal of Econometrics 73 (August): 387–99.
———. 1998. Measurement error in the Current Population Survey. Journal of Labor Economics 16 (July): 576–94.
Bound, John, and Alan B. Krueger. 1991. The extent of measurement
error in longitudinal earnings data: Do two wrongs make a right? Journal of Labor Economics 9 (January): 1–24.
Bratsberg, Bernt, and James F. Ragan, Jr. 2002. Changes in the union wage
premium by industry—data and analysis. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 56 (October): 65–83.
Card, David. 1996. The effect of unions on the structure of wages: A
longitudinal analysis. Econometrica 64 (July): 957–79.
Dickens, William T., and Lawrence F. Katz. 1987. Inter-industry wage
differences and industry characteristics. In Unemployment and the
structure of labor markets, ed. Kevin Lang and Jonathan S. Leonard,
pp. 48–89. New York: Blackwell.
Farber, Henry S., and Bruce Western. 2002. Accounting for the decline
of unions in the private sector, 1973–98. In The future of private sector
unionism in the United States, ed. James T. Bennett and Bruce E. Kaufman, chap. 3. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Freeman, Richard B. 1984. Longitudinal analyses of the effects of trade
unions. Journal of Labor Economics 2 (January): 1–26.
———. 1986. In search of union wage concessions in standard data sets.
Industrial Relations 25 (Spring): 131–45.
Freeman, Richard B., and James L. Medoff. 1984. What do unions do?
New York: Basic Books.
Gibbons, Robert, and Lawrence Katz. 1992. Does unmeasured ability
explain inter-industry wage differentials? Review of Economic Studies
59 (July): 515–35.
Gregory, Robert G., and Jeffrey Borland. 1999. Recent developments in
public sector markets. In Handbook of labor economics, vol. 3C, ed.
Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Groves, Robert M., and Mick P. Couper. 1998. Nonresponse in household
interview surveys. New York: Wiley.
Heckman, James J., Hidehiko Ichimura, and Petra E. Todd. 1998. Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator. Review of Economic Studies
65 (April): 261–94.
Heckman, James J., Robert J. LaLonde, and Jeffrey A. Smith. 1999. The
economics and econometrics of active labor market programs. In Handbook of labor economics, vol. 3A, ed. Orley C. Ashenfelter and David
Card. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Helwege, Jean. 1992. Sectoral shifts and interindustry wage differentials.
Journal of Labor Economics 10 (January): 55–84.
Hirsch, Barry T., and David A. Macpherson. 2000. Earnings, rents, and

722

Hirsch/Schumacher

competition in the airline labor market. Journal of Labor Economics 18
(January): 125–55.
———. 2002. Union membership and earnings data book: Compilations
from the Current Population Survey. Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs.
Hirsch, Barry T., David A. Macpherson, and Edward J. Schumacher. 2004.
Measuring union and nonunion wage growth: Puzzles in search of
solutions. In The changing role of unions: New forms of representation,
ed. Phanindra Wunnava. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Hirsch, Barry T., and Edward J. Schumacher. 1998. Unions, wages, and
skills. Journal of Human Resources 33 (Winter): 201–19.
Hirsch, Barry T., Michael L. Wachter, and James W. Gillula. 1999. Postal
Service compensation and the comparability standard. Research in Labor Economics 18:243–79.
Kim, Dae Il. 1998. Reinterpreting industry premiums: Match-specific productivity. Journal of Labor Economics 16 (July): 479–504.
Krueger, Alan B., and Lawrence H. Summers. 1988. Efficiency wages and
the inter-industry wage structure. Econometrica 56 (March): 259–93.
Lewis, H. Gregg. 1986. Union relative wage effects: A survey. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Lillard, Lee, James P. Smith, and Finis Welch. 1986. What do we really
know about wages? The importance of nonreporting and census imputation. Journal of Political Economy 94 (June): 489–506.
Mellow, Wesley, and Hal Sider. 1983. Accuracy of response in labor market
surveys: Evidence and implications. Journal of Labor Economics 1 (October): 331–44.
Polivka, Anne E., and Jennifer M. Rothgeb. 1993. Overhauling the Current Population Survey: Redesigning the questionnaire. Monthly Labor
Review 116 (September): 10–28.
Rubin, Donald B. 1983. Imputing income in the CPS: Comments on
“Measures of aggregate labor cost in the United States.” In The measurement of labor cost, ed. Jack E. Triplett. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press and National Bureau of Economic Research.
———. 1987. Multiple imputation for nonresponse in surveys. New York:
Wiley.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2002. Current
Population Survey: Design and methodology. Technical Paper no. 63RV.
http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/tp/tp63.htm.

